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I. Introduction
The microfinance revolution has brought about unprecedented competition in
credit markets within many developing countries. Economists usually view
competition favorably, but increased competition in microfinance has resulted
in a number of unforeseen difficulties. Recent findings report that greater
competition among lenders has increased problems of borrower overindebtedness, reduction of loan repayment incentives, and growing arrears for microfinance institutions (MFIs) in competitive environments (Campion 2001;
McIntosh and Wydick 2005).
The weakening performance of microfinance in competitive environments
is due in part to the absence of information sharing in these markets. Because
growing numbers of MFIs increase the level of asymmetric information between lenders, credit information systems (often called credit reporting bureaus
or credit bureaus) can play a crucial role toward improving credit market
performance and, in turn, credit access for the poor.
The importance of information in credit markets is well established in such
seminal papers as Akerlof (1970), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Hoff and
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Stiglitz (1998). Credit information systems act as information brokers that
increase the transparency of credit markets. However, in many developing
countries, credit information systems are still in their infancy, and information
sharing among lenders remains weak. As competition in microfinance lending
intensifies in these countries, borrower information becomes all the more
important. The MFIs are increasingly utilizing the services of credit bureaus
to address a fundamental problem of all credit markets, asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders that can lead to problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard. Motivated by industry survival amid increasing
competition, a wide array of lending institutions in developing countries are
becoming increasingly aware of the essential role that credit information systems play toward the creation and maintenance of an efficient financial system.
This article offers a descriptive account of the growth in credit information
systems in developing countries and an empirical test of the effects of a newly
implemented credit bureau in Guatemala. Section II of the article provides
an empirical description of the credit reporting environments found today in
various parts of the developing world, offers a review of previous research on
credit information systems, and gives a brief history of the development of
credit information systems. In Section III, we present the data set and estimation technique used to capture the screening effects of the newly implemented Guatemalan credit bureau. In Section IV, we present our results, which
largely confirm the positive role that information sharing can play in improving
lending performance. Our estimations indicate that improved screening effects
from the system caused the level of portfolio arrears to decline between 1 and
3 percentage points in the 6 months after it was successively implemented in
each branch office. We observe even more substantial effects of the system in
reducing late monthly payments made by borrowers. A cost-benefit analysis
of the credit information system shows that MFI investment in the system
generated an estimated internal rate of return to the institution of 96.5%.
Moreover, we find that, in a competitive microfinance market, a reduction in
the default rate by our point estimate of 1.92 points would lower interest
rates in a competitive market by 2.59 percentage points. These positive effects
are sensitive, of course, to the impact of the system on reducing default rates.
Section V concludes with policy recommendations that stem from our research.
II. Credit Information Systems: Existence, Theory, and Evidence
A. Credit Bureaus in the Developing World
Throughout the developing world, the growing availability of consumer credit
and the heightened competition among microfinance institutions have made
the necessity of credit information sharing all the more apparent. However,
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the extent and efficiency of information sharing mechanisms vary greatly
among countries and continents. Africa remains the region of the world with
the least developed credit information systems, yet the exploding microfinance
sectors in many African countries have sparked interest in the feasibility of
the creation of credit bureaus to help manage borrower risk under heightened
competition. Similarly, Asian economies are witness to recent growth in credit
bureau coverage, including increased awareness of the necessity of information
sharing among the multiple microfinance lenders in South Asia. For example,
in Bangladesh, the “birthplace” of microfinance, increasing competition among
large microfinance lenders such as the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC), and RD-12 has sparked a World
Bank–assisted initiative to introduce a specialized credit bureau into the country’s microfinance sector. This credit bureau aims to build a national database
in order to manage any systemic risk that might be caused by the present
uncoordinated competition among MFIs. The goal is that the credit bureau
can help to mitigate the rising problems of nonrepayment of microloans and
client overlap among the largest MFIs in Bangladesh.1
Latin America arguably has the most extensive coverage of credit information
systems among developing regions, with credit information sharing recently
being extended even into the microfinance sector. A pertinent example is
Bolivia. Prior to 1999, Bolivian law forbade the existence of private credit
bureaus (Campion 2001), believing that credit data were too sensitive and
important a topic to entrust to the private sector. Meanwhile, its public credit
registry had refrained from collecting information from its burgeoning microfinance sector while intense competition among MFIs was allowing clients
to borrow from multiple institutions and in numerous cases reaching unsustainable levels of debt, leading to skyrocketing default rates in the microfinance
sector in the late 1990s. The crisis led the Bolivian government to rewrite
its laws to allow for the existence of private credit bureaus, such that credit
bureaus now operate in Bolivia with a special focus on microfinance loans.
B. Theoretical Work
The subject of credit information systems operating in the microfinance sector
has been virtually untouched by the academic literature. McIntosh and Wydick
(2004, 2005) show that the existence of a credit bureau may improve credit
access for the poorest borrowers. Assuming that credit markets are competitive,
information sharing lowers lender costs through lower default rates. This
implies that, in a zero-profit equilibrium, borrowers with lower levels of initial
1

See Matin (2001) for a more complete description of this project.
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assets become added to microlender portfolios. Other research is mostly limited
to a number of case studies (Abreu 2001; Campion and Valenzuela 2001;
Lenaghan 2001).
A large body of work, however, examines the role that information sharing
will play in more developed credit markets. Using a pure adverse selection
model, Jappelli and Pagano (1993) analyze the factors that lead to endogenous
communication among lenders in a credit market. They find that information
sharing is more likely to occur when the mobility of households is high, the
pool of borrowers is heterogeneous, the credit market is large, and the cost
of information exchange is low. Fear of competition can make lenders hesitant
to share their client information, yet a credit bureau is a “natural monopoly”
with increasing returns to scale; when some lenders begin to share information,
it creates an incentive for other lenders to share information as well.
Vercammen (1995) and Padilla and Pagano (2000) argue that limits to the
information exchanged among lenders can lead to improved repayment. Vercammen uses a multiperiod model with adverse selection and moral hazard
to show that a certain level of adverse selection is required in a credit market
in order to give rise to borrower reputation incentives and thus aggregate
welfare. He concludes that a system of full information sharing may be less
efficient than one designed to preserve some level of asymmetric information,
such as limiting the length of borrower data that is maintained.
Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000) focus on the effect of information sharing
as a “borrower discipline device” under perfect competition. They conclude
that borrowers have greater incentive to perform if lenders only exchange
negative information, arguing that sharing positive borrower characteristics
can ease the negative impacts of default and mitigate the disciplinary effect
of a credit bureau. Jappelli and Pagano (2000) posit that the usefulness of
credit bureaus is reduced in developing countries where large informal sectors
exist in which enforcement of repayment is difficult. They suggest that granting credit bureau access to informal lenders would increase the credit bureau’s
usefulness for both formal and informal lenders due to the economies of scale
that define the industry. Jappelli and Pagano also argue that better information
may lead banks to shift from collateral-based lending policies to more information-based policies.
Margaret Miller’s (2003) Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy
provides a comprehensive source for the institutional aspects of credit reporting.
Miller’s own chapter in the volume uses results from a World Bank internet
survey to offer empirical data on the status of credit reporting activities around
the world. Miller shows how credit bureaus can provide borrowers with “reputation collateral,” frequently viewed as more valuable than physical collateral
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by surveyed lenders. Furthermore, Miller argues that the types of data collected
by a credit bureau often provide the best predictors of repayment.
Jappelli and Pagano (2002) provide an initial empirical investigation of the
existence and impacts of credit bureaus in various economies around the world.
They find that the presence of credit information systems is associated with
broader credit markets and lower credit risk. Nevertheless, rigorous evaluation
methods on the effect of credit bureaus in developing countries is nonexistent
in the literature, creating a gap that this article attempts to fill.
C. Information Sharing Arrangements
How does a credit information system improve the functioning of a credit
market? As shown formally in McIntosh and Wydick (2004), credit information systems first create a screening effect that improves risk assessment of
loan applicants, thereby raising portfolio quality, which, in turn, reduces rates
of arrears. Second, their very existence creates an incentive effect that may
deter negligent borrower behavior as information about borrower behavior is
shared among lenders. Some borrowers who are on the margin of misusing
borrowed capital may be dissuaded from doing so if they sufficiently value
future access to loans. In a competitive credit market, these efficiencies are
passed on to borrowers in the form of a lower cost of capital. Improved
informational flows thus enhance the efficiency and stability of the entire
financial system. Yet because of the public good characteristics of credit information systems, the natural emergence of lower costs in the credit market
is not always guaranteed.
Consequently, the breadth, depth, and general efficiency of credit information systems vary greatly among countries. Credit reporting, at some level,
is a critical part of the financial system in most developed economies; in
developing countries it is often much weaker if not altogether absent. This
is because in a zero-information-sharing environment, repayment discipline in
credit transactions typically happens via the oft-repeated transactions between
a borrower and a single familiar lender in less developed countries (LDCs).
However, because borrowers often lack the ability to send signals of their
creditworthiness to the entire pool of potential lenders in LDCs, they are more
susceptible to borrowing terms being dictated by a solitary lender with whom
they have had a past borrowing relationship. In this way informational flows
among lenders can paradoxically shift market power to borrowers.
The most basic level of information sharing among lenders involves sharing
only negative information, such as borrower defaults and arrears. The simple
creation of a public “blacklist” produces both screening and incentive effects,
mitigating both adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the credit
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market. The existence of the blacklist helps lenders to avoid risky borrowers,
and the fact that borrowers want to avoid being on the blacklist improves
repayment incentives for borrowers who make it into the lending portfolio.
The most advanced information sharing arrangements, however, include
positive borrower data in addition to the negative data. Positive data, or a
“white list,” may include the debtor’s overall loan exposure and guarantees,
data from past credit history other than defaults and arrears, and debtor
characteristics such as employment, income, or line of business (Jappelli and
Pagano 2000). The sharing of positive information allows for the debtor to
create vital “reputation collateral,” often in the form of a credit score that can
provide valuable information to the credit market and signal a borrower’s
individual credit worthiness to a large pool of lenders. As demonstrated in
McIntosh and Wydick (2005), the sharing of positive information helps to
mitigate borrower overindebtedness, lower default rates in the overall credit
market, and (in competition) reduce equilibrium interest rates.
III. Empirical Work: Hypotheses and Data
The subject for our empirical work is CREDIREF, a newly implemented,
specialized credit bureau covering the microfinance sector of Guatemala. By
the late 1990s, multiple loan taking by MFI clients had become so extensive
that REDIMIF, an association of 19 MFIs, joined to establish CREDIREF, a
centralized microfinance credit bureau, which has been functional since March
2002, in the central and eastern areas of Guatemala. Provoked by a desire to
avoid an industry-wide repayment crisis similar to that experienced in Bolivia,
CREDIREF’s operations have grown steadily since its inception. By January
of 2003, its database held information on upward of 120,000 borrowers.
CREDIREF now collects data from six of the largest microfinance lenders in
the country, while other MFIs are slowly being incorporated into the system.
Participation in CREDIREF includes a flat $70 monthly membership fee
plus an additional cost per consultation that decreases as the number of consultations rises. The first 100 consultations made per month each cost $1.60,
and prices decrease steadily to $0.67 per consultation for over 6,400 consultations per month. Due to this fee structure and the potentially significant
fixed costs of upgrading systems to provide digital reports, some small MFIs
are unable to afford consultation fees. In other countries, credit bureaus have
alleviated this problem somewhat with the solution of charging a membership
fee that is scaled to the size of each participating institution. (For example,
Bolivia’s public credit registry charges participating financial institutions an
annual fee equal to 1/1,000 of their total assets [Campion 2001].)
CREDIREF collects and distributes a variety of data on microfinance bor-
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rowers, including positive and negative payment information. The data it
collects on a borrower include the name, national identification number, size
of current or most recent loan, whether the client is in default on any loan
or payment, size and frequency of payments on current loan(s), and a 2-year
history on the borrower’s repayment record. The name of the lending institution is not included in a borrower’s credit report in CREDIREF, an attempt
to mitigate fears of client stealing among lenders. Additionally, CREDIREF
does not provide a credit scoring service, leaving the individual institutions
responsible for performing their own evaluations of potential borrowers.
We perform an impact analysis on CREDIREF’s introduction, using data
from the accounts of Génesis Empresarial (“Génesis”), a large-scale MFI and
CREDIREF member that has 40 branch offices located throughout the country.
The different branches began using the credit bureau at varying times. Panel
data on the branch-level monthly arrears of Génesis provide a dynamic measurement of the credit bureau’s impact as it was implemented office by office.
To supplement these administrative data, during the summer of 2003, we
carried out fieldwork, researching the implementation of CREDIREF in Guatemala. We surveyed 184 of Génesis’ clients from six branch offices to learn
what changes the introduction of a credit bureau had made in their borrowing
behavior. The six branches visited were selected in order to have a wide range
of implementation dates as branches entered into the credit bureau (see fig.
1 for a map of the branch offices of Génesis).
Génesis provides both positive and negative client information to CREDIREF and is consulting the database on an increasingly high share of loans
disbursed. In June 2003, for example, Génesis branches made a total of 1,266
consultations to CREDIREF’s database, of which 787 provided information
on outside borrowing activity not otherwise observable to the lender. However,
despite the growing importance of CREDIREF to Génesis operations, Génesis
clientele had remained largely uneducated about the credit bureau’s existence
and operation. Of 184 surveyed clients from six branch offices from June to
August of 2003, not one was aware of the credit bureau’s creation.2 This
finding is consistent with prior research showing that virtually no attention
has been paid to educating consumers about credit reporting in Latin America
(Miller 2003).
This dampens the effectiveness of the credit bureau, as knowledge of the
existence of the credit information system is required to produce an “incentive
2

Clients were asked both about the existence of a bureau in abstract and specifically about their
knowledge of CREDIREF, and in both cases they were not aware that a bureau was sharing their
information.

This content downloaded from 138.202.189.82 on Mon, 8 Dec 2014 17:33:59 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

320

economic development and cultural change

Figure 1. Map of Guatemala, featuring national department boundaries and the locations of the branches
of Génesis Empresarial.

effect.” If borrowers are unaware that their loan histories are being shared
among various lenders and do not understand the implications of this, borrowing behavior will remain unchanged and the total effect of credit bureau
implementation will consist solely of the screening effect.
As a result, our empirical work consists of a test for the pure screening
effect of the credit bureau. We generate data to focus on the screening effect
by writing the repayment performance of a loan onto the day on which it was
received. This generates the possibility of a discontinuity in outcomes between
those selected just before the use of a bureau and those selected just after.
The implementation of CREDIREF was technologically complex, requiring
the branch offices of Génesis to improve hardware, software, and networking
capabilities. For this reason, the rollout was staggered over the course of 18
months, taking place in nine different waves. Table 1 outlines the process.
We take the 34 administrative branch offices of Génesis that saw implementation of the bureau during the study period as the unit of analysis.
Outcomes are calculated as monthly averages, and the 1,504 bureau/month
observations form an unbalanced panel because some Génesis branches began
operations after September 2000. We lack detailed, time-varying control data
on the branches, and so, while we are able to conduct a variety of statistical
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TABLE 1
ORDER OF BRANCH INTRODUCTION TO CREDIT BUREAU

Month of Introduction
August 2001
February 2002
April 2002
June 2002
August 2002
September 2002
October 2002
November 2002
January 2003
Not included

Branch Name
Metro Dos, Zona 4, Santa Lucia
Guatemala Personal, El Castano, Chimaltenango, Antigua, San
Juan Sacatepequez, Tecpan, El Castano
Coban, Salama, San Pedro Carcha, San Cristobal, Tactic
Esquintla, Suchitepequez, Retalhuleu, Chiquimulilla, Guastatoya
Jutiapa, Jalapa, Cuilapa
Zacapa, Chiquimula, Esquipulas
Peten, Poptun, Melchor de Mencos
Izabal, Raxruha, Sayaxche, Morales, Los Amates, El Estor
La Libertad
Pozo Maya

Note. Prior to March 2002, dates signify when ofﬁces began consulting INFORNET, a complementary risk-management database to CREDIREF. INFORNET closed operations in May of 2003,
and now CREDIREF operates alone. INFORNET provided only negative information on press
publications, court rulings, any public record information, and credit card and bank account information. Treatment is considered to be the same whether the date of introduction is to CREDIREF
or INFORNET for each branch.

tests, we must in general assume that time-varying, branch-specific determinants of repayment are orthogonal to the structure of the rollout of the
bureau.
One possibility that would affect the accuracy of our estimations would be
if the installation of the new hardware and software needed to run the new
system affected repayment rates in other ways than the influence of the credit
information system itself. We view this as unlikely. Borrower repayment rates
are influenced most directly by the screening of clients, the productivity and
behavior of borrowers, shocks received by borrowers, and the fieldwork practices
of loan officers. Since the introduction of the system left other functions of
the MFI unchanged, except for the added screening mechanism in the loan
review process, it is unlikely that the introduction of new computers, servers,
and software needed to operate the system had any direct effect on loan
repayment by borrowers.
As a measure of loan delinquency, we feature the percentage of loans in a
branch that were late as of the last payment made. This is a very sensitive
measure of repayment that picks up roughly twice the number of problems
as the technical definition of default used by the institution (which includes
only loans beyond a month overdue). We feature this measure because it varies
more than technical default and also because it can be calculated directly from
the accounts of the institution. The data otherwise available from the institution on technical default in a month are the stock of bad loans, whose
month-to-month changes are a composite of forgiveness and new defaults and
therefore difficult to interpret.
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Figure 2. Change in delinquency over time

We also examine three additional outcomes: the percentage of loans in a
branch/month on which a payment is ever late, the average number of late
payments per loan in a branch/month, and the average number of months
late for loans issued in a branch/month that become delinquent, which measures the severity of repayment problems. Because some branch/months have
no delinquency, this variable is missing for almost half the observations.
IV. Empirical Results
As a first take on the data, figure 2 plots the percentage of loans ever late
and the percent delinquent over time. There is a clear visual improvement in
the “percent ever late,” while any potential decrease in delinquency appears
more modest. The nature of the quasi-experiment used for identification can
be more clearly seen in figure 3, which lines up the staggered entry of the
branches into CREDIREF so that zero indicates the month in which every
branch entered. Now there appears to be a clearer impact on both outcomes.
“Percent ever late” jumps discontinuously and appears to have a kink in the
slope, and while the effect on delinquency is less clear, it does appear to have
fallen fairly discontinuously from a mean of 20% to a mean of 18% or so.
In order to formalize the analysis of a discontinuous treatment effect, we
pursue an iterative set of t-tests to examine how many months must be
considered before a paired t-test of pre- and post-treatment means within
branches becomes significant. We begin by comparing 1 month before treat-
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Figure 3. Change in delinquency around rollout

ment to 1 month after, then the mean across the 2 months before treatment
to the mean 2 months after, and so on. Figures 4 and 5 plot the results of
this exercise. The effect on delinquency appears to be continuous; the first
month is very close to zero and insignificant, while by the fourth month we
see significance of a difference of close to 3 percentage points. The impact on
percent ever late, however, does show discontinuity; within the first month a
difference of greater than 4 percentage points exists. While, on average, over
2 months is required in order to smooth outcomes and reduce variance sufficiently to generate significance, the difference is essentially unchanged as the
window expands.
A more fine-grained set of t-tests is presented in table 2. Here we test
branch by branch for pairwise differences in the pre-treatment and posttreatment levels of delinquency, using all time periods available. The results
are again quite clear; of the 13 branches with significant changes at the 90%
level, only one of those saw higher post-treatment delinquency; in the remainder, it decreased. The branch with increasing delinquency was already an
outlier in terms of levels; moreover, this branch, Zona 4, is located in a part
of the capital that saw spiraling drug-related violence during the study period.
Comparing t-tests provides an intuitive way of approaching the question
of impact in a quasi-experiment and has the additional advantage that, in
cases of autocorrelated outcomes, such before-after mean comparisons remain
consistent (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2003). Once we are including
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Figure 4. T-tests of bureau impact, % delinquency

a longer time period in our analysis, however, it becomes necessary to introduce
controls for time in order to avoid spurious treatment effects.
Table 3 presents a set of analyses using month- and branch-level fixed effects,
Outcomeit p ai ⫹ gt ⫹ dCBit ⫹ mit ,
where ai is the branch-specific fixed effect, gt is a month dummy, CBit is the
treatment indicator, and mit is an error term.
Two treatment indicators are used. The first, a dummy equal to zero before
the bureau was rolled out to a branch and one after, indicates the presence of

Figure 5. T-tests of bureau impact, % loans ever late
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF DELINQUENCY ACROSS BRANCHES

Branch
3. Metro Dos, Zona 4
4. Metro Tres, El Castano
5. Chimaltenango
6. Antigua
7. Esquintla
8. Suchitepequez
9. Retalhuleu
10. Izabal
11. Zacapa
13. Chiquimula
14. Coban
16. San Juan Sacatepequez
17. Jutiapa
18. Jalapa
19. Peten
21. Cuilapa
22. Esquipulas
23. Chiquimulilla
24. Santa Lucia
25. Salama
26. Guastatoya
28. San Pedro Carcha
29. Rabinal
31. Raxruha
32. Poptun
33. Sayaxche
34. La Libertad
35. Morales
36. Los Amates
37. San Cristobal
38. Tactic
39. El Estor
40. Melchor de Mencos
41. El Castano
Overall

Pre-treatment
Arrears

Post-treatment
Arrears

Change

2.65
22.16
11.12
16.00
24.05
12.85
17.71
23.91
19.96
19.46
32.96
18.98
21.09
23.36
15.36
21.48
17.44
16.36
16.44
16.51
31.60
23.54
32.34
19.56
15.84
16.81
15.10
24.74
22.35
24.54
35.04
37.34
18.01
8.69
20.09

5.25
25.98
12.65
18.09
20.41
11.80
16.15
16.99
11.67
22.72
29.41
19.22
20.20
17.49
14.82
15.39
18.70
14.36
18.35
10.16
24.44
22.35
16.52
10.17
9.98
11.52
16.82
18.40
15.02
21.51
23.16
16.03
11.37
8.73
17.12

2.60***
3.82
1.53
2.09
⫺3.64*
⫺1.05
⫺1.56
⫺6.92**
⫺8.29***
3.25
⫺3.55
.24
⫺.89
⫺5.86
⫺.54
⫺6.09**
1.26
⫺2.00
1.92
⫺6.35***
⫺7.16**
⫺1.20
⫺15.82***
⫺9.40**
⫺5.86***
⫺5.30
1.71
⫺6.34*
⫺7.33*
⫺3.03
⫺11.88
⫺21.31***
⫺6.64
.03
⫺2.97***

* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.

the bureau, while a variable measuring the number of checks performed in
the bureau each month measures the intensity of use. The strongest impact
seen here is a huge decrease in the average number of missed payments; this
outcome responds strongly to both presence and intensity of use of the bureau.
The use of the bureau decreases the percentage of loans on which any payments
are missed by 3.3 percentage points and the number of missed payments by
1.3. It is interesting that the impact of the bureau on delinquency, at 1.1
percentage points, is both smaller than that seen in the t-tests and insignificant.
Regressions performed using less robust error structures resulted in an outcome
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TABLE 3
FIXED-EFFECT REGRESSIONS WITH MONTH DUMMIES

Treatment Variable
Dummy for Use of Bureau

Number of Checks/Month

Outcome Variable

Coefﬁcient

SE

P 1 FtF

Coefﬁcient

SE

P 1 FtF

N

% delinquent
% ever late
Number of late payments
Months, if delinquent

⫺1.122
⫺3.326**
⫺1.311***
⫺.222

.860
1.490
.401
.488

.201
.032
.002
.652

.0005
⫺.0150
⫺.0084***
⫺.0049

.006
.010
.002
.003

.933
.131
.000
.121

1,504
1,504
1,504
824

Note. All regressions are weighted by the size of the loan portfolio and use robust clustered standard
errors.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.

that was just significant at the .05 level, but the presence of autocorrelation
within bureaus sufficiently increases the standard error as to render a p-value
of only 0.20. The number of months by which late payments were late shows
no change.
If, instead of controlling for time using month dummies, we use a linear
time trend, we can check not only for the mean effect of the bureau but also
for the presence of a kink in the rate of change of outcomes after the introduction of the bureau:
Outcomeit p ai ⫹ bt ⫹ dCBit ⫹ r(CBit # t) ⫹ mit .
Table 4 presents the results of estimations performed using fixed effects at the
branch level and errors robust to clustering within branches. The result for
“delinquency” here is very much in line with the visual impression given by
figure 2, a level drop of about 2% with little change in slope. The results for
“percent ever late” coincide with figure 3; this outcome, as well as the number
of late payments and the months late variable, show a strongly decreased trend
after the implementation of the bureau but no level effect. The implication
is that, while the bureau had a fixed small effect on delinquency, the other
indicators saw an improvement that was increasing in experience with the
bureau. These results would be consistent with the need to learn how to use
the bureau to maximum advantage.
An additional question is whether the magnitude of the treatment effect
is related to the levels of the outcome variables when the bureau was introduced. By taking the last outcome variable observed before the use of the
bureau and interacting this (demeaned) outcome with the treatment dummy,
we can answer this question. We continue to use branch- and month-level
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TABLE 4
FIXED-EFFECT REGRESSIONS WITH BEFORE/AFTER TRENDS

Outcome Variable
% delinquent
Time trend
Bureau dummy
Trend after bureau
% ever late
Time trend
Bureau dummy
Trend after bureau
Number of late payments
Time trend
Bureau dummy
Trend after bureau
Months, if delinquent
Time trend
Bureau dummy
Trend after bureau

Coefﬁcient

SE

P 1 FtF

.019
⫺1.924**
⫺.117*

.057
.841
.068

.740
.028
.094

⫺.312*
.379
⫺.799***

.163
3.065
.230

.063
.902
.001

⫺.069*
⫺.253
⫺.159***

.039
.664
.054

.082
.705
.006

⫺.190***
⫺.145
⫺.070**

.031
.506
.032

.000
.777
.036

Number of
Observations
1,504

1,504

1,504

824

Note. All regressions are weighted by the size of the loan portfolio and use robust clustered standard
errors.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.

fixed effects and therefore do not need to include the uninteracted pre-treatment outcome because it is subsumed in the branch-level fixed effect:
Outcomeit p ai ⫹ gt ⫹ dCBit ⫹ r(C # BitOutcome 0i ) ⫹ mit .
The results of this exercise are presented in table 5. Again, we observe that
the use of month-level fixed effects eliminates the significance of the bureau
on delinquency, but all three of the other outcomes display strong negative
interaction effects. The implication is that the higher the level of the outcome
was prior to the use of the bureau, the larger the fall in outcomes once the
bureau was introduced. Hence, the bureau is most effective at reducing late
payments and months in delinquency where these problems were worse before
implementation.
A. Robustness Checks
The value of the quasi-experiment generated by the staggered rollout of CREDIREF for measurement purposes depends on the timing of that rollout. If,
for example, the sequencing of the rollout is correlated with expected rates
of change in the outcomes, then a bias will be introduced. Equivalently, if
branches in crisis at any moment in time were given the bureau and the
outcomes display a tendency toward mean reversion, then our impact estimate
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TABLE 5
INTERACTIONS WITH OUTCOMES BEFORE ROLLOUT OF BUREAU

Outcome Variable
% delinquent:
Credit bureau dummy
Interaction with pre-bureau
% ever late:
Credit bureau dummy
Interaction with pre-bureau
Number of late payments:
Credit bureau dummy
Interaction with pre-bureau
Months, if delinquent
Credit bureau dummy
Interaction with pre-bureau

Number of
Observations

Coefﬁcient

SE

P 1 FtF

⫺1.334
⫺.087

.885
.083

.141
.306

1,440

level

⫺4.585***
⫺.313***

1.401
.069

.003
.000

1,440

level

⫺1.429***
⫺.444**

.324
.036

.000
.000

1,440

level

⫺.219
⫺.451***

.342
.050

.526
.000

806

level

Note. All regressions are weighted by the size of the loan portfolio and use robust clustered standard
errors.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.

would be biased downward. If true, mean reversion would influence the observed interaction effects in table 5.
In order to test for endogeneity in the sequencing of the rollout, we perform
a number of comparisons of pre-treatment averages across the month in which
the branch first began to use the bureau. This analysis is performed both in
levels, which test for whether the sequencing was endogenous to the outcomes,
and in first differences, which test for endogeneity in the rate of change. Time
of rollout is measured using a variable that begins at 1 in January 2000 and
increases by 1 for every month thereafter. Table 6 presents the results of OLS
regressions of these outcomes on the rollout time as well as Spearman rank
correlation coefficients for whether there is correlation between the rank of
the outcomes and the rank in which the bureau was received. The first differences show no relationship to the sequencing of rollout, although the level
of delinquency is nearly significant at the .10 level in the Spearman test. Figure
TABLE 6
TESTS FOR ENDOGENEITY OF ROLLOUT

Ordinary Least Squares

Level of outcome:
% delinquent
% ever late
First differences:
% delinquent
% ever late

Spearman

Coefﬁcient

P 1 FtF

P 1 FtF

⫺2.239
⫺2.359

.27
.52

.11
.23

⫺.118
⫺.274

.61
.42

.45
.50

Note. The independent variable is the month in which the bureau was received
by the branch (January 2000 p 1 with increase of 1 for each subsequent month).
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Figure 6. Delinquency by month bureau introduced

6 plots this relationship as well as the fitted values from the OLS regression.
We see that indeed there is a slight downward trend (meaning that those
with higher initial delinquency got the bureau first) but that the problem is
not severe.
Since rates of change are not correlated with the rollout, the primary concern
raised by this analysis is that, in the presence of mean reversion, some bias
may exist due to correlation between the order of the rollout and initial branch
delinquency. To test for mean reversion, table 7 shows the results of similar
OLS and Spearman tests for whether a correlation exists between the first
observation of each outcome in the data and the subsequent trend in that
outcome prior to the introduction of the bureau. There is no evidence here
for mean reversion, an impression which is reinforced by figure 7, which plots
initial levels against subsequent changes, along with the fitted OLS values.
The absence of mean reversion in the data is reassuring not only in confirming
the basic structure of this quasi-experiment but also in aiding our ability to
draw causal inference from the results of the interactions presented in table 5.
TABLE 7
TEST FOR MEAN REVERSION

Average Monthly Change
prior to Bureau
% delinquent
% ever late

Ordinary Least Squares

Spearman

Coefﬁcient

P 1 FtF

P 1 FtF

.005
.012

.74
.61

.74
.32

Note. The individual variable is the initial level of outcome.
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Figure 7. Test for mean reversion

B. Assessing Costs and Beneﬁts of a Credit Information System
Given that our results indicate significant impacts on portfolio quality, we
investigate whether the discounted benefits of a system such as CREDIREF
exceed the discounted costs of its implementation. We address several pertinent
questions: Are the benefits to an individual MFI of a credit information system,
as we measure them, worth the cost of its implementation? Based on our
estimates, what is the probability that the net present value of such a system
to a credit institution is greater than zero? And finally, what are the welfare
implications of such a system being implemented in a competitive market?
According to administrators, the costs to Génesis were principally composed
of installation of hardware, new telephone lines, and additional furniture to
each of their 40 branch offices needed to support the system. (Here we convert
all figures from Guatemalan quetzales to U.S. dollars.) For each branch office,
new hardware amounted to approximately US$8,000, new telephone lines to
US$450, and furniture to approximately US$800. Total software costs to the
institution were US$1,280, making the total costs of installation to Génesis
equal to US$371,280. (These assets were expected to need replacement or
updating on average every 3 years; we therefore use this 3-year time horizon
in our analysis.) CREDIREF is operated by an outside entity, Banca Red, to
whom Génesis pays the fixed monthly fee of US$70 plus an average of US$1.14
for each consultation to the database plus a US$0.26 telephone charge. On
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average administrators report about 2,000 consultations per month, making
the variable costs of consultations equal to US$34,400 per year.
At the end of 2004, the total value of Génesis’ portfolio of microloans was
US$25,441,273. We have several estimates of the effect of the information
system in our research. The overall average drop in observed branch-level preand post-treatment arrears was shown to be 2.97 percentage points. Our fixed
effects estimation using month dummies yields an (insignificant) drop of 1.12
percentage points, while our estimation controlling for (before and after) trends
shows a (significant) drop of 1.92 percentage points. Given its significance and
the importance of controlling for trends, we use the latter in our analysis.
Not all loans in 30-day arrears are written off and represent a loss to the
institution. Consistent with the observed pattern in Génesis, we will thus
assume that approximately half of this amount can be recovered at little or
no cost to the institution and/or is compensated for by interest penalties,
while the other half is either written off or is recovered only at a cost equal
to the debt itself. We will refer to this figure as the default rate. This would
suggest that CREDIREF is able to save Génesis US$244,745 per year in
allowances for bad debt. Assuming a discount rate of 10% (a rough approximation of the constantly varying weighted cost of funds to the MFI
through a combination of commercial borrowing and below-market loans),
this yields a net present value of the CREDIREF information system over
3 years to Génesis of US$185,570, or US$61,857 per year. The net present
value is fairly insensitive to the interest rate; implementation of the system
carries a colossal internal rate of return of 96.5%. It is, however, sensitive
to the reduction in default rate yielded through implementation of the
system. For the net present value of implementation of the system to remain
positive, the reduction in 30-day arrears must exceed 1.34 percentage points.
A standard error on the estimate of 0.841 implies that implementation carries
a projected positive net present value at slightly more than a 75% confidence
level, assuming the level of 30-day arrears reduction is the only stochastic
element in system implementation.
The reduction in arrears from the system should also reduce the interest rate
offered by the institution if microfinance markets are competitive and borrower
information is widely accessible. If economic profits per dollar loaned are zero,
then (1 ⫺ d ) (1 ⫹ r) ⫺ (1 ⫹ c ⫹ F) p 0, where d is the default rate, r is the
interest rate, c is the cost of borrowing, and F is the administration cost per
dollar on a new loan of average size. Using December 2003 figures for Génesis,
we have (approximately) that d p 0.04, r p 0.36, and c p 0.10. Solving for
F, we find that, in equilibrium, F would be equal to about 0.15. If we solve
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for the institutional interest rate and differentiate with respect to the default
rate, we obtain
⭸r
1⫹c⫹F
p
≈ 1.35.
(1 ⫺ d)2
⭸d
Thus, for our estimated system impact of a 1.92 percentage-point decline in
the default rate, we would estimate a decline in a competitive interest rate of
approximately 2.59 points.
V. Conclusions and Implications for Policy
Credit information systems help build an efficient financial system by promoting transparency in lending. They are effective tools toward mitigation of
adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets, and they have been found
to lower overall default and interest rates and improve the pool of borrowers
in formal credit markets. A survey of credit information systems worldwide
reveals that developing countries are quickly realizing the importance and
usefulness of information sharing and that there has been burgeoning growth
in the implementation of such systems in the last decade, particularly in Latin
America and Asia. The explosion in microfinance activity in developing countries has contributed to this need. We presented evidence that the beneficial
effects of credit information systems are to be found when bureaus are utilized
in the microfinance sector. We believe that increased competition in many
regions among microfinance lenders has made credit bureaus a necessary step
toward financial sector stability.
CREDIREF has had a strong impact in terms of decreasing the prevalence
of missed payments in Génesis. The introduction saw a discontinuous drop in
the percentage of clients missing a payment, and the effect gathered strength
over the course of the time the bureau was used. The fall in the percentage of
clients missing payments is 4.5 percentage points plus an additional .3 percentage
points per month the system is used. Impact on the number of late payments
is similarly dramatic. Evidence for the impact of CREDIREF on delinquency
is more mixed; using t-tests or a regression with fixed effects and a linear time
control we find a significant reduction of from 1 to 3 percentage points as a
result of the use of the system, where in some estimations the effect becomes
insignificant. The implication is that there was a nonlinear fall in delinquency
after the bureau that was common to all of the branches; how we ascribe causality
for this drop determines whether or not the causal effect of the bureau is significant on delinquency. The number of months by which late payments are late
shows no immediate improvement, but there exists a gradual improvement over
time, that is, 2 days shorter delinquency period for each month that CREDIREF
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is used. There is evidence that CREDIREF has the strongest impact in environments where the repayment problems were worst to begin with.
How are we to interpret this strong fall in missed intermediate payments
without a correspondingly strong impact on eventual delinquency? One answer
would relate to the additional kinds of information to which credit officers gain
access through the use of the system. If we assume that borrowers who have
had a given type of repayment problem with one lender will continue to have
the same kinds of problems with other lenders, one possible explanation presents
itself. Applicants for loans already go through extensive screening procedures
that include interviews with neighbors and business associates. It may be that
past default is a sufficiently dramatic and public event that preexisting screening
mechanisms were sufficient to catch such applicants. Missing payments, however,
is likely to be the private information of the lender and borrower, and so it may
be this more nuanced understanding of past performance that is the unique
contribution of CREDIREF to the information set possessed by credit officers.
Seen from this perspective, the fact that the impact on intermediate payments
is much stronger than on eventual default is reasonable.
An extension of this work is the importance of the incentive effect formally
derived in McIntosh and Wydick (2004) in realizing the full benefit of a positive
information sharing network. Our finding during fieldwork that not one surveyed
client in Guatemala had been aware of the credit bureau’s existence was disturbing. With borrowers unaware of their role in an information sharing arrangement, incentive effects cannot be realized. This causes the full potential
for credit bureaus to remain unrealized in improving credit market performance.
Given that the estimates of impact given here consist solely of the screening
effects, they should be viewed as a lower bound on the full impact of the
introduction of a robust credit reporting system whose rules are well understood
by borrowers. Client outreach and education in this regard may have efficiency
benefits in addition to being equitable.
As credit markets continue to expand and overlap, the functioning of credit
bureaus takes on greater importance. While the microfinance revolution provided many with access to credit for the first time, its ability to continue to
do so depends upon sustainability of the market. The potential for credit
bureaus is immense in this area.
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